Published 2026-09-26 · 4 min read

Why Pseudo-Profound Quotes Feel So Deep

"Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty." A randomly generated sentence with no meaning at all - and in a 2015 study, most people rated it as fairly profound.


In 2015, a team of researchers led by Gordon Pennycook fed a handful of abstract nouns - "wholeness", "attention", "hidden meaning", "transformation" - into a website that stitched them together into grammatically correct sentences with no actual content. Sentences like "Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty" or "We are in the midst of a self-aware blossoming of being that will align us with the nexus itself."

They showed these randomly generated sentences to people and asked one question: how profound is this, on a scale of one to five?

The average rating was around 2.6 out of 5 - solidly on the "somewhat profound" side, for sentences that had been assembled by a random word generator and meant absolutely nothing.

What the researchers actually measured

The point of the study was not to mock anyone. It was to isolate something the authors called bullshit receptivity: how willing a person is to see profundity in a statement that is syntactically fine but semantically empty. To make sure this was not just people being generous with meaningless sentences in general, the researchers compared the ratings to genuinely profound quotations (which scored higher, on average) and to plain, mundane sentences (which scored lower). The pseudo-profound sentences sat in between - not treated as nonsense, but not treated as ordinary either.

Crucially, receptivity to these sentences varied a great deal between people, and it correlated with other things that also make sense together. People who scored higher on bullshit receptivity also tended to score lower on tests of analytic thinking and verbal intelligence, and higher on belief in things like alternative medicine and precognition. None of these correlations were huge, and correlation is not causation here - the study cannot tell you that believing in precognition makes you fall for vague sentences, or the reverse. What it does establish is that there is a real, measurable individual difference in how readily people find apparent depth in language that has none, and that this difference is not random noise.

Why some sentences fool the profundity detector

Three features seem to do the heavy lifting. The sentences use abstract, vague nouns - "consciousness", "potential", "the universe" - that can be mapped onto almost any personal situation the reader happens to be thinking about, similar to how a vague personality description invites you to see yourself in it. They are syntactically well-formed, which matters more than it should: your brain uses grammatical correctness as a cheap, fast signal that a sentence was written with intent and meaning, and that signal fires whether or not there is anything behind it. And they invoke connection and transcendence - words implying that everything is secretly linked to everything else - a theme that feels significant almost by default, regardless of whether any actual claim is being made.

Later work by Pennycook and David Rand extended this idea to a very different kind of content: fake news headlines. Their 2019 study found that people who were more likely to rate obviously false political headlines as accurate also tended to score lower on a test of analytic thinking, regardless of whether the headline favoured their own political side. Their conclusion, captured in the paper's title, was that susceptibility to fake news is better explained by not stopping to think than by being specifically motivated to believe things that flatter one's own group.

An old idea with new data

None of this is a new observation dressed up in statistics. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt had already given a name to language produced to sound meaningful without any real concern for the truth in his short 2005 book On Bullshit - distinguishing it explicitly from lying, since a liar at least cares what the truth is in order to hide it. What Pennycook's research adds is a way to measure who falls for it and why, rather than just naming the phenomenon.

What this does not mean

This research is not a licence to dismiss anything unfamiliar or poetic as "pseudo-profound." Genuinely profound ideas are often also abstract, and plenty of real insight sounds simple stated plainly. The bullshit-receptivity scale measures a tendency, not a verdict on any single sentence, and the samples in this line of research are mostly university students and online panels in Western countries - not necessarily representative of how everyone everywhere processes language. It also says nothing about a person's intelligence in general; it says something narrower, about a moment-to-moment willingness to accept apparent depth without checking it.

This has an obvious commercial angle too. Self-help slogans, motivational posters and some brands of spiritual marketing lean on exactly the ingredients described above - abstract nouns, confident grammar, a suggestion of hidden connection - because they reliably produce a feeling of insight without requiring the writer to make a checkable claim. That is not proof that everything marketed this way is empty, but it is a reason to treat the feeling of profundity as a starting point for scrutiny rather than a stopping point.

What this means for you

Next time a sentence gives you that little jolt of "whoa, that's deep," try translating it into the plainest words you can find. If the meaning survives translation, it was probably a real idea. If it dissolves into fog the moment you try to restate it - if "the universe is a symphony of connected potential" turns out to mean nothing more specific once you try to paraphrase it - that jolt was doing the work that the sentence itself could not.

Sources

  • Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015). On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit. Judgment and Decision Making, 10(6), 549-563. doi:10.1017/s1930297500006999
  • Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39-50. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011
  • Frankfurt, H. G. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton University Press.
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